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FIFTH AMENDMENT-RESPONDING TO
AMBIGUOUS REQUESTS FOR
COUNSEL DURING CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATIONS
Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Davis v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court resolved how law enforcement officers should respond during custodial
interrogation of a suspect, when that suspect makes an ambiguous or
equivocal request for counsel. The Court held that, after suspects
knowingly and voluntarily waive the rights articulated in Miranda v.
Arizona,2 law enforcement officers may continue questioning them until and unless they clearly request an attorney.3 The Court in Davis
believed that the suspect's remark, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,"
was not a clear request for counsel and, thus, held that the law enforcement officers did not violate the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by continuing to question
him.

4

This Note first addresses Supreme Court precedent safeguarding
the Fifth Amendment and then explores the three approaches to ambiguous requests for counsel that state and circuit courts developed
prior to Davis. This Note then argues that the Court's ruling ignores
the central precepts of the Miranda case law and fails to provide adequate measures to counter the realities of custodial interrogations.
Additionally, this Note argues that the Court should have promulgated a rule that obligates law enforcement officers to clarify any ambiguity before further questioning suspects. To effectively safeguard
suspects' privileges under the Fifth Amendment, this obligation to
clarify should prohibit law enforcement officers from badgering suspects into converting their previously ambiguous request for counsel
into a clear waiver of the right to counsel. If any ambiguity remains,
the officers should consider the request an invocation of the right to

1 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
4 Id. at 2357.
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counsel.
H.

BACKGROUND

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to all people the privilege to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. 5 Since 1966, Miranda has served as the touchstone for the
exploration of the scope of that privilege during a period of custodial
interrogation.6 To safeguard the Fifth Amendment privileges, Miranda specifically requires at the outset that authorities clearly inform
persons in custody that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say can and will be used against them in court, that they
have the right to consult with an attorney and to have an attorney with
them during the interrogation, and'that if they cannot afford an attorney, the court will appoint an attorney to represent them.7 After receiving these warnings, they may "voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently" waive these rights.8 However, if the individual "indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consuit with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that
he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him."9
Prosecutors cannot use statements obtained from a suspect in
custody against the suspect in court unless the prosecution demonstrates that authorities effectively applied the Mirandaprocedural safeguards to preserve the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.' 0 The Court
in Mirandacreated these procedural safeguards to adequately ensure
that the accused know their rights and that the police honor them."
The Court clearly recognized that "[ain individual swept from ...
familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, and subjected to... techniques of persuasion ... cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak." 12 Without such safe5 The Fifth Amendment provides: "[No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.

6 SeeJanet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register The Pragmatics of Powerlesses

in Police

Interrogation, 103 YALE LJ. 259, 292-93 (1993).
7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-72.
8 Id. at 444.
9 Id. at 444-45.
10 Id. at 444.
11 Id. at 467.
12 Id.at 461. The Court detailed a history of police brutality and torture and concluded

that such practices "are undoubtedly the exception now, but... are sufficiently widespread
to be the object of concern." Id. at 447. The Court then described the psychological aspects of modem interrogative techniques. Id. "Even without employing brutality, the
'third degree' or... specific stratagems... the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
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guards, the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogations will undermine suspects' resistance and compel them to speak
where they would otherwise remain silent or request the assistance of
3
counsel.'
In Edwards v. Arizona,' 4 the Court fine-tuned the application of
Miranda. The Court in Edwards held that when an accused invokes
the right to counsel, all questioning must cease until counsel arrives
or until the accused initiates further conversation. 15 According to the
Court in Edwards, the fact that suspects respond to additional policeinitiated questioning does not establish a valid waiver of their rights
even though they had been advised of those rights. 16 The Court in
Edwards emphasized that "it is inconsistent with Mirandaand its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused
in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel." 17
Miranda and Edwards clearly mandate that a custodial interrogation cease immediately when the suspect asserts the right to counsel.
The assertion of this right is a "significant event" that calls for an end
to the interrogation until an attorney is present.'8 Indeed, the Court
described Miranda as a "rigid rule that an accused's request for an
attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease"' 9 and has recognized the "undisputed
right" to remain silent and to be free from questioning "until he ha[s]
20
consulted with a lawyer."
Before Davis, state and federal courts applied three different standards to determine whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney invoked the right to counsel. Courts in some
jurisdictions held that any reference to counsel by the accused, howheavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." I. at 455. See

also Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 294.
13 Id. at 467.
14 451 U.S. 477 (1981).

15 Id. at 484. Specifically, the Court held that
[A] dditional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now
hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only
that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has
been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having

expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police.
Id.
16
17
18
19

Id.
Id. at 485.
Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979)).
20 Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980)).
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ever ambiguous or equivocal, requires the immediate cessation of the
interrogation. 2 1 Other jurisdictions required a suspect's mention of
counsel to meet a "threshold standard of clarity,"22 with comments
falling short of the threshold not sufficient to invoke the right to
counsel. 23 Still other jurisdictions held that all questioning must immediately cease in response to an ambiguous reference to counsel,
but the interrogators may ask questions designed to clarify the individ24
ual's desires concerning counsel.
The Supreme Court had previously declined to promulgate a uniform rule with respect to a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal request
for or reference to counsel. 25 In Smith v. Ilinois,26 a suspect had responded to Mirandawarnings by stating to the police "Uh, yeah. I'd
like to do that."27 Concluding that this was an unambiguous request
for counsel, the Court determined that it was unnecessary to formulate a rule to handle ambiguous statements. 28 In Connecticut v. Barrett, 29 the Court once again found that the defendant's statements did

not represent an ambiguous or equivocal response to the Miranda
21 See, e.g., Maglio v.Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205-07 (6th Cir. 1978); State v. Furlough, 797
S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1990); Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1978); People v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976); People v. Randall, 464 P.2d 114, 118-20 (Cal. 1970) (en banc), overnded by
People v. Cahill, 853 P.2d 1037 (1993).
22 Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984) (per curium).
23 See, e.g., Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2737 (1994); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385, 389 (Va. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 824 (1991); People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1019 (1981).
24 See, e.g., United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461-62 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 483 (1993); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 436 (1992); Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1411 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 419 (1992); United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988);
United States v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370, 370 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987);
United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056
(1987); Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979); Nash v. Estelle,
597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied; 444 U.S. 981 (1979); State v. Walkowiak,
515 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Wis. 1994); People v. Johnson, 859 P.2d 673, 685 (Cal. 1993), cert.
denieA 115 S. Ct. 1133 (1994); Crawford v. State, 580 A.2d 571, 576-77 (Del. 1990); Martinez v. State, 564 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1990); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 223
(Minn. 1988); People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 1987).
25 See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30 n.3 (1987); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
91, 96 n.3 (1984) (per curiam).
26 469 U.S. 91 (1984).

27 Id. at 94.

28 Id. at 99-100. Specifically, the Court stated: "We do not decide the circumstances in
which an accused's request for counsel may be characterized a ambiguous or equivocal as a
result of events preceding the request or of nuances inherent in the request itself, nor do
we decide the consequences of such ambiguity or equivocation." Id.
29 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
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warnings and thus, left open the question it finally addressed in
30
Davis.
THE THRESHOLD OF CLARITY RULE

A.

The threshold of clarity rule required that suspect's mention of
counsel meet a "threshold standard of clarity." 3 ' Under this approach, suspects would not invoke their right to counsel-and law enforcement officers would not be obligated to stop the interrogation or
clarify the situation-if the assertion fell short of this threshold.3 2 In
People v. Krueger,33 the leading case promoting the threshold of clarity
rule,3 4 the defendant had been convicted of murder and sentenced to
serve twenty to fifty years in prison.3 5 Prior to his trial, Krueger moved
to suppress inculpatory statements that he made to the police during
a custodial interrogation.3 6 Krueger had received his Mirandawarnings at the start of the investigation, but subsequently waived his rights
both orally and in writing. 3 7 The detectives began the interrogation
with questions concerning unrelated burglaries.3 8 When the detectives started to question him about the killing, Krueger said, "Wait a
minute. Maybe I ought to have an attorney. You guys are trying to
pin a murder rap on me, give me 20 to 40 years."3 9 One of the detec30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 529-30 n.3.
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984) (per curiam).
Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994).
412 N.E.2d 537 (Il1. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981).
See Smith, 469 U.S. at 96 n.3.
Krueger,412 N.E.2d at 538.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The testimony of the other detectives present at the interrogation was substan-

tially similar. On cross-examination, the defendant basically conceded that the detectives'
testimonies were accurate:
Q. Why did you continue talking to them after you say you said, "I think I should have
an attorney"?
A. Have you ever been interrogated by three Rockford Police Detectives?
Q. No, I haven't, but I want to know why you continued talking to them.
A. Because I believed it was self-defense. I still do. They wanted a statement of what
happened to clear it up. I wanted to get it off my chest, so I gave them a statement.
Q. But you know you had a right to have an attorney there if you wanted one, didn't
you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. You ever insist on having an attorney contacted?
A. I asked for an attorney before I began the statement, and I saw that it was not going
to get me anywhere, so Ijust ceased on that line, because Ijust knew I wasn't going to
get an attorney anyways.
Q. Did it occur to you not to talk any further?
A. Yes, but it occurred to me I might be up all night and be badgered by these three
detectives.
Id. at 539.
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lives replied that the news media, not the police, were calling it murder and that only two people knew what really happened and one of
them was dead. 40 Krueger then asked the officers how they knew the
stabbing was not in self-defense. 4 1 The detectives said they did not
know the circumstances and that was the reason they wanted to talk to
him about it.42 Krueger then signed a statement implicating himself
in the murder. 43
The Illinois Supreme Court held that because Krueger's ambiguous request did not reach the threshold of clarity, interrogating officers did not violate his Mirandarights. 4" According to that court, "a
more positive indication or manifestation of a desire for an attorney
was required than was made here." 45 Although the court in Krueger
acknowledged that the phrase "in any manner" asserted in the Court's
holding in Mirandapermits assertions of the right to counsel that are
not unmistakably clear, the court did not read Miranda as requiring
every reference to an attorney, no matter how ambiguous, to constitute an invocation of the light to counsel.4
The court in Krueger noted that the defendant was not subjected
to any coercion in excess of what is inherent in all custodial interrogations.47 Furthermore, the court believed that the detectives apparently acted in good faith in notjudging the defendant's statements to
be a request for counsel. 48 While the court felt that it shouid not unduly emphasize the detectives' subjective beliefs, it recognized the importance of allowing law enforcement officials some discretion in this
determination. 49 The court then found the officers' beliefs to be reasonable under the circumstances. 50 Because the defendant's manifestation of his right to an attorney failed to reach some requisite level of
clarity, the court concluded that the police had not violated the defendant's Miranda rights. 5 1
B.

THE PER SE RULE

Under the per se rule, any reference to counsel in a custodial
40 Id. at 538-39.
41

Id. at 539.

42 Id.
43 Id.

44 Id. at 540.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.

48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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interrogation, without regard to its ambiguity or equivocality, precludes further questioning.5 2 In Maglio v. Jago,5s the leading case
adopting this approach, 54 the Sixth Circuit, relying on both Miranda
and Michigan v. Mosley, 55 held that the police violate a defendant's
Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they do not cease question56
ing after that defendant makes an ambiguous request for counsel.
The court believed that the following language in Mirandasuggested
this per se rule:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an
opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during
any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney
speaking to police, they must
and he indicates that he wants one before
57
respect his decision to remain silent.
The court also found support for the per se rule in Supreme Court
case law that distinguished between asserting the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. 58 Specifically,
the reasons to keep the lines of communication between the authorities
and the accused open when the accused has chosen to make his own
decisions are not present when he indicates instead that he wishes legal
authorities may then communicate
advice with respect thereto. The
59
with him through an attorney.
Based on these precedents and the circumstances of the case, the
court in Maglio concluded that the prosecution failed to show a knowledgeable and voluntary waiver.6 0 A police officer read the defendant
his rights at the time of the arrest, but continued to question the defendant despite his remark that "[m]aybe I should have an attorney."6 1 The officer told the defendant that an attorney would not be
available until the next day.62 The officer once again told the defendant that he was not required to talk without an attorney, but the of68
ficer continued to question him until he confessed to the murder.
52

Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978).

53 Id.
54 See Crawford v. State, 580 A-2d 571, 575 (Del. 1990).
55 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
56
57

Magio, 580 F.2d at 205.
Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)) (emphasis added by

Magio).
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975)
concurring)).

60

(White, J.,

Id. at 206.

61 Id. at 203.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 204. Specifically
Maglio was told first that he had a right to counsel before any questioning, and when
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When the district attorney arrived less than an hour later, he explained the defendant's rights and recorded the confession. Even
though this second confession occurred after the defendant's confusion was clarified, the court held it to be equally inadmissible. While
the defendant's subsequent statement indicated that he finally understood his rights, the district attorney nonetheless violated those rights
by continuing to interrogate him without defense counsel present-64
C.

THE CLARIFICATION RULE

The Fifth Circuit developed the clarification rule in Nash v. Estelle,6 5 where it held that when suspects express their desires ambiguously, law enforcement officials may make further inquiry aimed only
at clarifying the suspect's desires. 66 The court in Nash believed that
the Supreme Court contemplated this situation in Miranda.6 7 The
Court in Miranda noted that "[i]f [a suspect] is indecisive in his request for counsel, there may be some question on whether he did or
did not waive counsel. Situations of this kind must necessarily be left
to the judgment of the interviewing Agent" 6 8 Furthermore, the
Court's holding in Mosely shunned any attempt to impose "permanent
,"69 In Nash, after the district
immunity from further interrogation ....
attorney informed the suspect of his rights, the suspect expressed
both a desire for counsel and a desire to continue the interview withhe expressed a desire to talk to a lawyer, was promptly told that if he couldn't afford a
lawyer, he would have to wait until the next day to have one appointed for him. Then,

with scarcely a pause, let alone a cessation of questioning, and without honoring his
request for counsel, the police continued interrogation about the car, and the confession ensued.
Id.
64 Id. at 207. The following interrogation starkly illuminates the legitimacy of the "cat
out of the bag" theory
Q. Okay, I have just explained what your rights are, and, Dan I am going to ask you
this, Dan, at this time. Do you wish to go ahead and tell us what you know about this
death... and talk to us now without a lawyer present?
A. Am I just supposed to start talking or?
Q. No, do you want to talk to us without a lawyer being present?
A. Yes. You two are lawyers anyway.
Q. Yes, but I'm, do you want a lawyer yourself before you talk to us? You have to say
no, you can't just shake your head.
A. Yeah, I know, I forgot. It doesn't matter now.
Q. In other words, you are willing at this point to go ahead and tell [us] about what
happened out there without having your own lawyer here with you, is that correct?
A. Yeah, it's the same story, it doesn't much matter.
Id.
65 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
66 Id. at 517.
67 Id.

68 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 485 (1966)).
69 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
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out counsel. 70 After the suspect heard his rights, he stated, "[w] ell, I
don't have the money to hire one [an attorney], but I would like, you
know, to have one appointed."7 ' The prosecutor acknowledged the
defendant's request and told him that the interrogation would have to
end immediately. This prompted the defendant to say, "I would like
to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you." 72 Soon thereafter, the
prosecutor obtained both a waiver and a confession from the defendant.73 The district court concluded that the defendant asked for an
attorney. 74
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the
defendant never requested the assistance of counsel during questioning. 75 Rather, the Fifth Circuit felt that the defendant only wanted
assurance that he could still have counsel appointed in the future if he
discussed his involvement in the murder with the prosecutor at that
moment.7 6 The court looked to the transcript of the interrogation
and the surrounding circumstances to hold that the district court was
clearly erroneous in its interpretation. The defendant had been ap70 Id. at 517. The following is the relevant part of the interrogation between the defendant (NASH) and the prosecutor (FILES):
NASH: If I want a lawyer present, I just put down [on the waiver form] I want him
present?
FILES: Please just tell us about it. Any time we are talking and you decide that you
need somebody else here, you just tell me about it and we will get somebody up here.
NASH: Well, I don't have the money to hire one, but I would like, you know, to have
one appointed.
FILES: You want one to be appointed for you?
NASH: Yes, sir.
FILES: Okay. I hoped that we might talk about this, but if you want a lawyer appointed, then we are going to have to stop right now.
NASH: But, uh, I kinda, you know, wanted, you know, to talk about it, you know, to
kinda, you know, try to get it straightened out.
FILES: Well, I can talk about it with you and I would like to, but if you want a lawyer,
well, I am going to have to hold off, I can't talk to you. It's your life.
NASH: I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you.
FILES: Well, what that says there is, it doesn't say that you don't ever want to have a
lawyer, it says that you don't want to have a lawyer here, now. You got the right now,
and I want you to know that. But if you want to have a lawyer here, well, I am not
going to talk to you about it.
NASH: No, I would rather talk to you.
FILES: You would rather talk to me? You do not want to have a lawyer here right now?
NASH: No, sir.
FILES: You are absolutely certain of that;
NASH: Yes, sir.
FILES: Go ahead and sign that thing.
Id. at 516-17.
71 Id. at 516.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 517.
74

Id. at 518.

75 Id.
76 Id.
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prehended a week earlier and had orally confessed to the murder at
that time. To stop the interrogation at that moment, according to the
court, "would have denied to [the defendant] his true desire to explain himself and to continue with the interview." 77 Moreover, it
would be improper to assume that the prosecutor was a "devious trickster, who desired to subtly manipulate"7 8 the defendant, when in fact
the transcript disclosed that he "fairly and evenly" apprised the defendant of his rights and clarified the situation,7 9

M.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of 2 October 1988, Robert L. Davis and Keith
Shackleton, 80 both members of the United States Navy, played a game
of pool at the Enlisted Men's Club on the Charleston (South Carolina) Naval Base. 8 ' Shackleton lost the game and a thirty dollar wager,
which he refused to pay.8 2 Early the next morning his body was found
behind the commissary, a short distance from the club. 83 He had
been beaten to death with a blunt object.84
During their investigation of the crime, agents for the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) discovered that Davis visited the club that
evening and that he was absent without leave from his responsibilities
the next morning.8 5 The agents also learned that only privatelyowned pool cues could be taken from the club, and that only four
86
people, including Davis, had their own cues at the club that flight.
77 Id. at 51920.
78 Id. at 520.
79 Id. The dissent in Nash rejected the clarification approach and disagreed with the
majority's application of this rule to the facts of the case. Id. at 52 (Godbold, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, after the suspect's request for counsel, the prosecutor did
not limit his questioning to clarification, but instead intended to elicit a waiver and confession. Id. at 526 (Godbold,J., dissenting). The equivocal nature of the defendant's request
resulted only from further questioning after an unambiguous and unequivocal request. Id.
at 524 (Godbold, J., dissenting). The dissent considered the relevant exchange as follows:
NASH: If I want a lawyer present, I just put down [on the waiver form] I want him
present?
FILES: Please just tell us about it. Any time we are talking and you decide that you
need somebody else here, you just tell me about it and we will get somebody up here.
Id. at 525 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
80 Justice Souter's concurrence, the Petitioner's Brief, and the Respondent's
Brief identify the victim as "Keith Shackleton." The Majority opinion
identifies the victim as "Keith Shackleford."
81 Davis v. United States, 114 S: Ct. 2350, 2352 (1994).
82 Id. at 2352-53.
83 Id. at 2353.
84 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 8, 10.
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NIS agents first interviewed Davis on 20 October 1988.87 Davis
admitted that he was at the club that night and that he had played
pool with Shackleton. 88 Davis then explained that he had heard from
Wade Bielby and Bonnie Krusen that Shackleton was beaten with a
pool stick. 89 At the end of the interview, Davis turned over his pool
cues to the NIS agents and explained that the stain on the case was
probably catsup, but possibly his own blood.90 Later, various sailors
told the agents that Davis "either had admitted committing the crime
or had recounted details that clearly indicated his involvement in the
killing."9'
On 4 November 1988, NIS agents arrested Davis at the Naval Hospital, where he had been held in the psychiatric ward since October
28.92 The agents escorted him to the NIS office and handcuffed him
to a chair.93 The agents told Davis that he was a suspect in the killing,
that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be
used against him, and that he had the right to counsel and to have
counsel present during the interrogation. 94 Davis waived these rights,
both orally and in writing.95
During the first part of the interrogation, Davis described his activities on 1 October and 2 October 1988.96 The NIS agents asked
Davis questions that suggested his account conflicted with statements
made by other people and implied that he was involved in the murder.97 For example, the agents told Davis that his girlfriend denied
being at the Enlisted Men's Club on the night of the murder. 98 The
agents also said that they had a report indicating that Shackleton
owed him thirty dollars. 99 At this point-about an hour and a half
00
into the interview-Davis said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."
87

Id. at 5.

88 Id.

89 Brief for Respondent at 3, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 921949).
90 Petitioner's Brief at 5, Davis (No. 92-1949).
91 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
92 Petitioner's Brief at 7, Davis (No. 92-1949).
93 Id.
94 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
95 Id.
96 Respondent's Brief at 6, Davis (No. 92-1949).
97 Id. at 7.
98 Id.
99 Id.

100 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2353 (1994). Davis testified at the suppression
hearing to a different version of the events: "Well, [the agents] were talking to me, and I
said 'Well, I'd like a lawyer,' and they said 'We'll take a break,' and they walked out and left
me handcuffed to the chair." Respondent's Brief at 10, Davis (No. 92-1949). Davis also
testified that after a short break "[t]hey came back in and started questioning me again."
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According to the uncontradicted testimony of one of the agents, at
that point
[We m]ade it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that if he
wants a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that
we weren't going to pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he
asking for a lawyer or is he just making a comment about a lawyer, and
he said, [']No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,' and then he continued on,
and said, 'No, I don't want a lawyer.' 1 '
After a short break, the agents reminded petitioner of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel. 10 2 Nearly an hour later, Davis
stated that if he had killed Shackleton, he would have had to have told
someone about it. 1° 3 When the agents confronted Davis with evidence that he had in fact told someone that he killed Shackleton,
Davis said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else." 10 4 At
that moment the agents ceased questioning him. 10 5
At the general court-martial, the military judge denied Davis' motion to suppress the statements he made during his interrogation. 106
The court held that "the mention of a lawyer by the accused during
the course of the interrogation [was] not in the form of a request for
counsel and.., the agents properly determined that the accused was
not indicating a desire for or invoking his right to counsel." 10 7 The
08
general court-martial convicted Davis of unpremeditated murder'
and sentenced him to life in prison. 0 9
The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review
affirmed the findings and sentence of the trial court.1 10 Without comment, the court rejected all of Davis' arguments as meritless. 11
The United States Court of Military Appeals granted discretionary review and affirmed." 2 The court recognized the three different
approaches to a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel:
Some jurisdictions have held that any mention of counsel, however ambiguous, is sufficient to require that all questioning cease. Others have
attempted to define a threshold standard of clarity for invoking the right
Id. The trial court resolved this question of fact against Davis, and the Court of Military
Appeals affirmed, finding no clear error. United States v. Davis, 36 MJ. 337, 342 (1993).
1O1 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
102 Id.
103 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Davis (No. 92-1949).
104 Respondent's Brief at 9, Davis (No. 92-1949).
105 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
106 Id.
107 Respondent's Brief at 10, Davis (No. 92-1949).
108 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1988).
109 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
110 See United States v. Davis, 36 MJ. 837, 342 (1993).
11 Respondent's Brief at 10, Davis (No. 92-1949).
112 Davis, 36 MJ. at 342.
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to counsel and have held that comments falling short of the threshold
do not invoke the right to counsel. Some jurisdictions, including several
federal circuits, have held that 'all interrogation' about the offense 'must
immediately cease' whenever a suspect mentions counsel, but they allow
interrogators to ask 'narrow' questions designed to 'clarify' the earlier
statement and the accused's desires respecting counsel." 13
Noting that the Supreme Court had not resolved the issue, the court
simply chose to apply the third approach and held as a matter of law
that the statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," did not invoke
Davis' right to counsel, and that the NIS agents properly proceeded
4
with questions designed to clarify Davis' desires."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" 15 to decide
how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes
an ambiguous reference to counsel during a custodial
interrogation. 16
IV.

A.

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority," 7 affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Military Appeals." 8 Justice
O'Connor held that, after suspects knowingly and voluntarily waive
their Mirandarights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning them until and unless they clearly request an attorney." 9
Although Justice O'Connor recognized that it will often be good police practice for interviewing officers to clarify whether or not a suspect desires counsel, she refused to require officers to ask such
clarifying questions.' 20 Thus, if a suspect does not unambiguously request counsel, law enforcement officers need not stop questioning
2
them.' '
Justice O'Connor began by reviewing the cases setting forth procedural safeguards insuring the right against compulsory self-incrimination. 122 Justice O'Connor noted that under Miranda v. Arizona 2 3 a
suspect faced with custodial interrogation has the right to consult with
113 Id. at 341 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984) (per curiam)).
114 Id. at 341-42.
115 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993).
116 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2352 (1994).
117 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice
O'Connor.

118 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357.
19 Id. at 2356-57.
120
121
122
123

Id. at 2356.
Id.
Id. at 2354.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning. 124 Justice O'Connor further recognized that Miranda requires that police
explain these lights to a suspect before beginning questioning. 125
Justice O'Connor then noted that Edwards v. Arizona' 26 created "a
second layer of prophylaxis for the Mirandaright to counsel." 127 Specifically, if a suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease questioning until an attorney is present
or the suspect re-initiates the conversation. 128 Justice O'Connor believed that Edwards, which held that the knowing and intelligent
waiver standard protects the right to counsel, was "designed to prevent
police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Mirandarights." 129 Justice O'Connor believed that this prohibition on further questioning, like other aspects of Miranda,"is not itself
required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic
13 0
purpose."
Justice O'Connor next focused on the application of Mirandaand
Edwards to Davis.13 1 Justice O'Connor determined that courts faced
with the question of whether a suspect actually invoked the right to
counsel must make an objective inquiry to avoid difficulties of proof
and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations.' 3 2 To
invoke the Miranda right to counsel, a suspect must "at a minimum
[make a] statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attomey."13 3 Most significantly, Justice O'Connor determined that Supreme Court precedent
does not require clarifying questions or the cessation of an interrogation unless the suspect articulates a clear desire to have counsel present-i.e., clear enough for a reasonable police officer under the
circumstances to interpret the statement as a request for an attorney.'3 Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had previously concluded that "a statement either is such an assertion of the right to
counsel or it is not."'u 5 Justice O'Connor interpreted later Supreme
Court case law to explain that Edwards does not mandate that the in124 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 (1994).
125
126
127
128

Id.

451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Davis, 114 S. CL at 2355.
Id. at 2354-55 (citing United States v. Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1988)).

129 Id. at 2355 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).

Id. (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987)).
Id. at 2355.
Id.
133 Id. (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)).
134 Id.
135 Id. (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984)).
130
131
132
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terrogation cease. 136

Justice O'Connor rejected Davis' suggestion to broaden the scope
of Edwards to require that police officers stop questioning at the moment a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel.' 3 7 Justice O'Connor reasoned that such a rule "would transform
the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate
police investigative activity,"' 3 8 and would needlessly prevent police officers from questioning an unrepresented suspect if the suspect did
not wish to have the assistance of counsel.' 3 9 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor noted that the Court in Mirandastated that "if a suspect is
'indecisive in his request for counsel,' the officers need not always
cease questioning." 14
Justice O'Connor recognized that a rule "requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects whobecause of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of
other reasons-will not clearly articulate their right although they actually want to have a lawyer present." 14 1 However, Justice O'Connor
believed that the Mirandawarnings were sufficient to "dispel whatever
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process." 142 And the suspect
must affirmatively invoke the additional protection of Edwards by requesting an attorney. 143
Justice O'Connor then focused on "the other side of the Miranda
equation: the need for effective law enforcement." 144 Edwards provides a bright line for officers that does not unduly hamper real-world
investigation. 14 5 According to Justice O'Connor, a rule that requires
police officers to cease their questioning if a suspect makes an ambiguous statement that may or may not be a request for an attorney
would force police officers to engage in guesswork. 46
Justice O'Connor recognized that when a suspect makes an ambiguous statement "it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officer to clarify whether or not he actually wants an
attorney." 14 7 However, Justice O'Connor declined to adopt a rule re136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986)).
at 2356 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 485 (1966)).
(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)).
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quiring officers to ask clarifying questions. In the end, the Court was
unwilling to create "a third layer of prophylaxis" beyond Miranda and
Edwards that would prevent police questioning when the suspect
might want a lawyer. 148
Justice O'Connor then deferred to the lower court's conclusion
that Davis' statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not a
reasonably clear request for counsel. 149 Justice O'Connor saw no reason to disturb that conclusion.1 50 Thus, the NIS agents did not have
to cease questioning Davis.
B.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE

Although Justice Scaliajoined with the majority, he wrote a separate concurring opinion to address the separation of powers issue that
the majority ignored. 151 Justice Scalia believed that 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
"the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions," 15 2 should apply. 153 The majority declined to consider this
statute because the government expressly declined to argue it and because the issue was one of first impression involving the interpretation
of a federal statute.' 5 4 However, Justice Scalia disagreed with the
Court's refusal to consider the statute, arguing that legal analysis of
the admissibility of a confession without reference to the statute was
"an unreal exercise."' 55
Justice Scalia noted that every presidential administration has
generally avoided this provision since its enactment in 1968.156 Even
though Justice Scalia ultimately agreed with the Court that judgment
148 Id. at 2356-57.

149 Id. at 2357.
150 Id.
151 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
152 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct.

1599, 1600 (1994)).
153 18 U.S.C. § 8501 (1988) provides that "a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a). Courts shall determine voluntariness
on the basis of:
all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including... whether
or not [the] defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any
statement[;] ...whether or not [the] defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and... whether or not [the] defendant
was without the assistance of counsel when questioned ....
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors ... need not be
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1988).
154 See Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 (1994).
155 See id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing OFFCE OF LEGAL POuCY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATroRNEY GENERAL ON LAW OF PRE-TPrAL INTERROGATION 72-73
(1986)).
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may be properly rendered here, he warned that as far as he was concerned, the next time the Court is confronted with this predicament,
it will consider the statute. 15 7 According to Justice Scalia, while the
Executive has the power to nullify some provisions of law by the mere
failure to prosecute, once a prosecution has been commenced and a
confession introduced, the Executive has neither the power nor right
to determine what objections to the admissibility of a confession are
valid in law.' 58 In sum, Justice Scalia believed that the Court's continuing refusal to consider § 3501 was not consistent with the Judiciary's
159
obligation to decide according to the law.
C.

JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Souter 160 concurred in the judgment. Justice Souter voted
to affirm Davis' conviction because he believed that the Constitution
does not prevent law enforcement officers from asking questions limited to clarifying whether suspects intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 16 1 Justice Souter upheld Davis' conviction
because he believed that Davis had made the self-incriminating statements only after the officers had apparently clarified his desire to continue without an attorney. 162 However, Justice Souter disagreed with
the Court's ruling that the officers had no obligation to clarify what a
suspect meant by an equivocal statement that could reasonably be understood as a request for counsel. 163 Justice Souter could notjoin in
establishing a rule that would allow the investigators to disregard a
suspect's reference to a lawyer-even if that reference, though ambig64
uous, could reasonably be understood as a request for counsel.
Justice Souter noted that Supreme Court precedent and a substantial body of state and circuit court law argue against the majority's
differentiation between suspects who ambiguously assert their right to
counsel and those who do so unambiguously. 165 In Justice Souter's
view, "[t]he concerns of fairness and practicality that have long
anchored our Miranda case law point to a different response: when
law enforcement officials 'reasonably do not know whether the suspect wants a lawyer,' they should stop their interrogation and ask him
157 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
159 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
160 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined justice Souter's concurrence.
161 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
162 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).

163 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
164 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
165 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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to make his choice clear."168
According to Justice Souter, a rule requiring investigators to determine the meaning of a suspect's equivocal statement before initiating further interrogation would satisfy the two ambitions of nearly
thirty years of case law addressing the relationship between police and
criminal suspects in custodial interrogation. First, it would ensure
that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. 167 Second, it
would ensure that the justification for Mirandarules remain consistent
16s
with practical realities.
Justice Souter then demonstrated how the Court's approach fails
to adhere to these two principles. 16 9 According to Justice Souter, suspects who are "'thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run
through menacing police interrogation procedures' would seem an
odd group to single out for the Court's demand of heightened linguistic care."17 0 The many suspects who lack a confident command of the
English language will be sufficiently intimidated or overwhelmed by
their predicament that they will lose the ability to speak assertively.' 7 '
Justice Souter further argued that the standard governing waivers of
the right to counsel does not distinguish between initial waivers and
later decisions to reinvoke them. According to Justice Souter, Miranda'sobjective was to guarantee "a continuous opportunity to exercise [the right of silence] ."172
Justice Souter criticized the Court's toleration of the fact that
some poorly expressed requests for counsel will be disregarded. 7 3
Unlike the Court, Justice Souter believed that a reading of Miranda
rights does not alleviate the inherent coercion of the interrogation. 7 4
Justice Souter further criticized the Court's reading of Moran v.
Burbine,17 5 which quotes Miranda: "[i]f the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, or [if he] states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease." 176 According to justice Souter, this language does
167

Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing id. at 2355) (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring).

168
169
170

Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (SouterJ., concurring) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)).

171

Id. at 2360-61 (SouterJ., concurring).
Id. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.).

166

172

Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
175 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
176 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2362 (1994) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 420 (1986)).
173
174
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not readily tolerate police practice that "frustrat[es] the suspect's sub177
jectively held (if ambiguously expressed) desire for counsel."
Finally, Justice Souter focused on the threat to the core of Fifth
Amendment protection. 178 He feared that the majority's approach
79
will not adequately protect the inarticulate or intimidated suspect.'
After attempting to invoke a right to counsel that falls short of the
majority's standard, a suspect "may well see further objection as futile
and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation." 8 0 Furthermore, Justice Souter found no precedent dictating
that interrogators may presume that an ambiguous statement is not a
request for counsel and continue questioning. 18 Thus, Justice Souter
182
argued that clarification was the "intuitively sensible course."
Justice Souter then challenged the Court's assertion that its rule
will promote more effective law enforcement and maintain the "ease
of application." 18 3 First, he asserted that while the confessions lost
due to clarification extract a real price from society, it is a price that
the Court in Miranda determined should be borne.18 4 Second, he
noted that the question "how clear is clear?" is not so easily answered
in police stations and trial courts. 185 Unlike the majority rule, the
clarification approach would guarantee that the "judgment call' will
be made by the party most competent to resolve the ambiguity, who
our case law has always assumed should make it: the individual
86
suspect."'
Turning to the petitioner's argument that even ambiguous requests require an end to all police questioning, Justice Souter stressed
that he was unwilling to adopt such a rule.' 87 According to Justice
Souter, ceasing the interrogation when a suspect unambiguously expresses a desire for it to continue could potentially impede the strong
88
bias favoring individual choice.'
Justice Souter ended with a look towards the future. 189 He noted
that the Court should adopt the rule proposed by the petitioner if
experience reveals that less drastic means are ineffective to safeguard
177 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring).
178 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2361-63 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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suspects' rights.

90

In conclusion, Justice Souter hoped that the

Court's ruling would not lead to trial courts demanding "suspects to
speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don" and that interrogators would continue to follow "good police practice" and ask clarify-

ing questions. 191
V.

ANALYSIS

Until Davis, state and federal courts had promulgated three distinct approaches to determine whether a suspect's ambiguous reference to an attorney invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
The majority in Davis adopted the threshold of clarity approach: a
suspect's reference to counsel must reach a high threshold level of
clarity to constitute an invocation of the right to counsel. 19 2 If the
suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for
a lawyer, law enforcement officers do not have an obligation to stop
the interrogation. 193 Furthermore, officers are not required to attempt to clarify such ambiguities.' 9 4 Justice Souter, in his concurrence, advocated for the clarification approach: when suspects make
an ambiguous reference to an attorney, interrogators should stop
their interrogation and clarify the suspect's desires. 195 The per se approach, which no member of the Court supported, regarded an ambiguous reference to an attorney as an invocation of the right to
counsel. 196 The per se approach demanded the complete cessation of
questioning if a suspect's ambiguous statement could be reasonably,
understood as a request for counsel. 19 7 The petitioner in Davis attempted to put a twist on this line of reasoning by distinguishing between ambiguous references to counsel and ambiguous requests for
counsel. 198
Ultimately, none of these approaches satisfactorily protects the
constitutional rights illuminated in Miranda. The Davis threshold of
clarity approach construes Supreme Court precedent too narrowly
and fails to balance the competing demands of effective law enforcement and constitutional safeguards. The per se approach, including
the variation advocated by the petitioner, would constrain effective
190 Id. (Souter J., concurring).

191 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 2356.
193 Id.
194 rd.

195 Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
196 Brief for Petitioner at 11, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 921949).
197 Id. at 12.
198 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949).
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law enforcement. The clarification approach similarly fails to strike a
proper balance among these competing factors. A more focused version of the clarification approach would provide an effective response
to ambiguous or equivocal references to counsel in the custodial
setting.
A.

PROBLEMS WITH THE THREE MAJOR APPROACHES

1.

The Davis Threshold of Clarity Approach

The Davis threshold of clarity approach fails to adequately safeguard the constitutional rights of a suspect confronted with custodial
interrogation. The Court in Miranda, discussing the coercive nature
of these interrogations, believed that such an environment "carries its
own badge of intimidation" and may not only be physically intimidating, but a threat to human dignity as well.' 9 9 Common sense and social science suggest that people who feel powerless or intimidated are
more likely to resort to unintentionally equivocal language. 20 0 To secure a statement that is truly the product of the suspect's free choice,
adequate procedures are necessary to "dispel the compulsion inher20 1
ent in custodial surroundings."
The Davis rule has another weakness. Equivocal language is not
just a product of the "inherently coercive" atmosphere of the custodial
environment-it is also the everyday expression and conversation tool
for many people. A serious flaw in the Davis rule is its "implicit assumption that direct and assertive speech . .. is, or should be, the
norm." 20 2 Some people are less likely to speak in a direct manner or
use assertive speech patterns. Such indirect speech patterns are "the
hallmark of a pragmatic usage by persons without power, and can be
found both in . . . female [speech patterns] and in the adaptive
speech patterns of subordinated African Americans forced to deal
with white authority figures." 20 3 Under Davis, these groups are more
likely to inadvertently waive the right to counsel. 20 4 While the majority in Davis stated that suspects need not articulate their invocation
"with the discrimination of an Oxford don," 205 this approach nevertheless requires individuals to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to
199 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
200 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2361 n.4 (1994) (SouterJ., concurring) (citing W. O'BARR, IANGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, PowER AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM
61-71 (1982)).
201 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
202 Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 315.
203 Id. at 318.
204 Id. at 319.

205 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994) (quoting id. at 2364 (Souter, J.,

concurring)).
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counsel with clarity seldom found in everyday speech. 20 6
The Davis threshold of clarity approach wrongly forces suspects,
"on pain of losing a constitutional right,"2 07 to select their words with
a level of precision that ignores real world expression and articulation.20 8 Justice Souter appropriately argued that suspects who are
"'thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing
police interrogation procedures' would seem an odd group to single
out for the Court's demand of heightened linguistic care."20 9 Indeed,
resolving ambiguity against the suspect actually rewards the exper210
ienced criminal, who is less likely to be unnerved by the situation.
Thus, the majority's approach operates most severely on the "ignorant
and unsophisticated suspect-that is, the suspect who has the most
211
need for constitutional safeguards.
The Davis threshold of clarity approach will lead to the denial of
2 12
counsel as a result of some poorly expressed desires for counsel.
The majority defends this inevitability on the ground that Miranda
warnings sufficiently dilute the coercion inherent in the-custodial setting.2 13 However, even the Court in Mirandarecognized the limits of
its own rule: "a once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation cannot itself suffice [to] ... assure that the...
right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process." 214 In sum, Miranda and Edwards cannot effectively safeguard rights guaranteed in the Constitution if interrogators can simply ignore a request for counsel that fails
to meet a threshold level of clarity unattainable by many in the real
215
world.
2.

The Per Se Approach

The viability of the per se approach has two significant problems.
First, it imposes an unreasonable strain on reasonable law enforce206
207

Petitioner's Brief at 17-18, Davis (No. 92-1949).
United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (1988).

208 Id.

209 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 457 (1966)).
210 People v. Randall, 464 P.2d 114, 118 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (dictum) overru/ed by
People v. Cahill, 853 P.2d 1037 (1993). See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 780 (1979)
(Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Chaneyv. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting)).
211 Randa, 464 P.2d at 118.
212 See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
213 Id.
214

469).
215

Id. at 2361-62 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486,
Petitioner's Brief at 17, Davis (No. 92-1949).
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ment, and second, it has a paternalistic element that prevents some
suspects from making their intended choices. The per se rule essentially forces police officers to abandon questioning at the moment a
suspect makes an ambiguous reference to counsel or even equivocally
expresses a desire for counsel. This may strain reasonable law en-.
forcement by "transform [ing] the Mirandasafeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity"2 16 and
needlessly hindering police efforts without helping suspects who did
not intend to invoke the right to counsel.21 7 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has consistently rejected paternalistic rules that protect defendants from their own intelligent and voluntary decisions.2 1 8
Allowing such a rule would "imprison a suspect in his privileges." 2 19
While the petitioner in Davis distanced himself from a rule that
would give talismanic power to the word "lawyer," the distinction he
made between ambiguous references to counsel and ambiguous requests for counsel is insufficient. The petitioner's approach simply
shifts the battlefront of future litigation to whether a statement was a
request or a mere reference. 22 0 The most significant flaw in this approach is the burden it would place on law enforcement officers. It
provides no brighter line than the threshold of clarity approach and
still forces interrogators to pass judgment on quite subtle facts underlying the inquiry of whether the statement was an ambiguous request
or an ambiguous reference.
3.

The ClarificationApproach

The chief problem with Justice Souter's clarification approach is
that overzealous investigators could abuse it, and the suspects who
make an ambiguous request could regard it as an attempt to suppress
that request, even where interrogators act in good faith.2 2 1 The Court
in Mirandarecognized that the goals of the interrogator and the interests of the suspect conflict in the adversarial system. 2 2 2 Safeguards
must make the suspect "acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of
the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting
216 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355-56 (quoting Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
217 Id. at 2356.
218 Respondent's Brief at 27, Davis (No. 92-1949) (quoting Mosey, 423 U.S. at 109
(White, J., concurring)).
219 See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109 (White,J, concurring) (quoting Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)).
220 Respondent's Brief at 24 n.16, Davis (No. 92-1949).
221 Reply Brief for Petitioner at i, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 921949).
222 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).

1995]

FFTHAMENDMENT

985

solely in his interest."2 23 Otherwise, the ultimate control over the
2 24
right to an attorney transfers from the suspect to the interrogator.
Specifically, there is a substantial risk in the clarification approach
that "officers will seek to find, or even to create, equivocalness where
there is none and in so doing force the suspect constantly to reassert
his right to counsel." 22 The approach may also induce the interrogator to delay granting a request for counsel, "in hope that in the interim the suspect will make some statement inconsistent with the
request opening up inquiry that will reveal (or produce) waiver of the
right previously asserted." 22 6 While the law is clear that questioning
must cease if a suspect asks for a lawyer, 227 the fear is that "'clarifying'
questions [may] shade subtly into illicitly badgering a suspect who
wants counsel." 2 28 Even if police act in good faith, suspects may still
interpret an attempt to clarify as badgering. 2 29 After listening to Mirandawarnings that acutely emphasize the right to counsel, suspects
who are then questioned about their true desires are likely to view the
situation as a "hesitancy to fulfill the request" or even as an "intention
not to provide counsel at all."230 Such an approach would invariably
increase-not minimize-the coercion inherent in the custodial
231
setting.
B.

THE "MODIFIED CLARIFICATION RULE"

A "modified clarification rule" will better balance the interests of
the suspect and the interrogator. The rule was first set forth in 1994
by Judge Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 232 This modified approach, like the standard clarification approach, would require interrogators to immediately cease questioning the suspect
about the crime when an ambiguous reference to or request for counsel is made.2 3 3 The interrogators' response to the ambiguity should
223 Id.

224 Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 526 (5th Cir.) (Godbold,J., dissenting), cet. denied, 444
U.S. 981 (1979).
225 Id.

226 Id.
227 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354-55 (1994) (citing Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
228 Id. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
229 Petitioner's Brief at 29-30, Davis (No. 92-1949).
230 Id. at 30.
231 Id.
232 State v. Walkowiak, 515 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
233 Id. at 870 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Here, the issue was whether the suspect's
question to the police, "Do you think I need an attorney?" was sufficient to invoke her right
to counsel. Id. at 864. In her concurrence, Judge Abrahamson referred to this inquiry as
an ambiguous request Id at 869 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
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be neutral and should focus solely on determining whether the suspect is invoking the right to counsel. "In other words, the police
[should] inform the suspect of the consequences of the ambiguous
statement and ask the suspect to decide whether to assert the right to
counsel." 23 4 Specifically, the following language would appropriately
clarify a suspect's ambiguous statement:
I have to stop questioning you now because I am not sure whether you
want a lawyer. You have a right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer present during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one
will be appointed to represent you. You will not be punished for deciding not to speak with me now, and you will not be rewarded for talking
with me now. If you talk with me now, anything you say can be used
against you in court. Do you want a lawyer?23 5
Interrogators may alter this language to fit the circumstances as long
as the message and tone remain the same.2

36

The clarification must

simply convey to the suspect "the consequences of the ambiguous reference to consulting an attorney (questioning stops); give the warnings about the right to counsel during interrogation; [and] ask the
suspect whether an attorney is wanted."23

7

The success of this modi-

fied approach depends on the steps law enforcement officers take after giving this clarified warning:
If, after hearing this warning, the suspect unambiguously requests counsel, the questioning must stop, unless and until it is reinitiated by the
suspect. If on the other hand, the suspect unambiguously agrees to
questioning without counsel, the questioning can continue. If after hearsuspect does not respond or continues to vacillate, the quesing the warning,the
23 8
tioning must stop.

This procedure minimizes the problems inherent in the original
clarification approach-the risk of police badgering suspects into
waiving their rights-and the problems inherent in the per se rulethe risk of crippling effective law enforcement. Limiting clarification
to this one-shot approach serves the goals of Mirandaand its progeny
better than the Davis standard. This approach balances the competing goals of Mirandaby effectively safeguarding the rights of a suspect
while still providing for effective and reasonable law enforcement.
Additionally, Supreme Court precedent, as well as state and federal cases, support the clarification approach more than the threshold
of clarity approach.23 9 Furthermore, such precedent logically permits
Id. (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
Id. at 870-71 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
Id. at 871 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
237 Id. (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
238 Id. at 871 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
239 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2359 (1994) (SouterJ., concurring).
234
235
236
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the leap to the modified clarification approach proposed in this Note.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the coercive forces inherent
in the custodial setting pose a direct threat to the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and while the procedural safeguards that the Court established "were not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution," they were deemed necessary to
the vitality of the Fifth Amendment. 240 To meet the demands of the
241
Fifth Amendment, the Court issued a rigid standard in Miranda:
"[i]f... [an accused] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning." 242 The "indicates in any manner" language reflects a need for a broader approach than the majority in
243
Davis adopted.
The Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that courts
must resolve any ambiguity in a request for an attorney against the
suspect.244 In Michigan v. Jackson,245 the Court considered whether a
defendant's request for counsel at an arraignment is effectively a request for counsel at all future proceedings or interrogations. 246 In
holding for the defendant, the Court recognized that the settled approach to questions of waiver of fundamental constitutional rights demands every reasonable presumption against such a waiver.2 47 While
precedent does not mandate a clarification approach, modified or
otherwise, the language of these opinions supports a more liberal rule
than the hurdle that the majority in Davis erected.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the modified clarification approach, giving interrogators
only one chance to clarify a suspect's ambiguous request for counsel,
240 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
241 State v. Walkowiak, 515 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Wis. 1994).
242 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)).
243 This language appears at several points in the Miranda opinions. See also Miranda,
384 U.S. at 478-74 ("If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior, to or
during questioning, that he wished to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.").
244 Brief for Petitioner at 23, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 921949).
245 475 U.S. 625 (1985).
246 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632-33.
247 d. at 633. Specifically, the Court stated:

This argument.., must be considered against the backdrop of our standard for assessing waivers of constitutional rights. Almost a half century ago.., the Court explained
that we should "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights."... Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. This settled approach to questions of waiver requires us to give a broad,
rather than narrow, interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel ....
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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most effectively balances the conflicting demands made upon the privilege against compulsory interrogation. The Davis threshold of clarity
rule requires individuals to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel with clarity seldom found in everyday speech. 2 48 Furthermore, the Davis rule ignores the overall purpose of Miranda rights as
well as the weight of judicial precedent, by failing to create a third
"prophylaxis" ensuring the vitality of the Fifth Amendment. The per
se approach unduly burdens law enforcement and falls to sufficiently
preserve suspects' control over their rights. The concurrence's clarification rule avoids these problems but fails to overcome problems inherent in the adversarial environment of custodial interrogations. In
contrast, a modification of the clarification approach that guides interrogators confronted with ambiguous requests for or references to
counsel will minimize the difficulties of the custodial interrogation
and more effectively safeguard the suspect's constitutional rights.
THOMAS 0.
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248 Brief for Petitioner at 18, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 921949).

